

## CHAPTER 2—The Police Effect on Crime

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### MULTIPLE CHOICE

1. To assert that the police make no difference at all on crime rates is
  - a. a logical conclusion from the totality of research.
  - b. our current “best guess.”
  - c. overly cautious.
  - d. illogical.

ANS: D                      PTS: 1                      REF: p. 31

OBJ: Characterize our state of knowledge of police impact upon crime.

2. Pessimism regarding the potential police impact on crime was reinforced by the
  - a. Kansas City Gun Reduction Experiment.
  - b. Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment.
  - c. San Diego Field Interrogation Experiment.
  - d. Newport News Problem-Oriented Policing Evaluation.

ANS: B                      PTS: 1                      REF: p. 32

OBJ: Describe why there has been pessimism regarding the potential of police impact upon crime.

3. Pessimism regarding the potential police impact on crime was reinforced by the
  - a. Campbell Hot Spot Meta-analysis.
  - b. Vera Institute Court Processing Study.
  - c. Stanford Research Institute Solvability Study.
  - d. RAND Criminal Investigation Report.

ANS: D                      PTS: 1                      REF: p. 32

OBJ: Describe why there has been pessimism regarding the potential of police impact upon crime.

4. Consistently accumulating evidence indicates the effectiveness of what strategy?
  - a. crime specific
  - b. community policing
  - c. preventive patrol
  - d. random, routine patrol

ANS: A                      PTS: 1                      REF: p. 33

OBJ: Identify the strategic approach with the most evidence for effectiveness.

5. Considerable drops in crime were produced by dramatically increased enforcement activity in the 1990s in what city?
  - a. Philadelphia
  - b. Houston
  - c. San Diego
  - d. Kansas City

ANS: B                      PTS: 1                      REF: p. 35

OBJ: Identify the two cities where considerable drops in crime were likely produced by dramatically increased enforcement activity.

6. The array of proactive crime interdiction efforts launched by Chicago in 2004 produced what reduction in the homicide rate?
- a. none
  - b. 3 percent reduction
  - c. 10 percent reduction
  - d. 25 reduction

ANS: D                      PTS: 1                      REF: p. 36

OBJ: Identify the two cities where considerable drops in crime were likely produced by dramatically increased enforcement activity.

7. Chicago's Violence Initiative Strategy Evaluation (VISE) program is best characterized as a classic model of
- a. community policing.
  - b. problem-oriented policing.
  - c. Compstat.
  - d. crackdowns.

ANS: C                      PTS: 1                      REF: p. 36

OBJ: Identify the two cities where considerable drops in crime were likely produced by dramatically increased enforcement activity.

8. Events in Cincinnati in 2001 illustrate the principle that
- a. crackdowns work.
  - b. the effect of crackdowns is short lived.
  - c. cessation of enforcement begets more crime.
  - d. correlation does not equal cause and effect.

ANS: C                      PTS: 1                      REF: p. 39

OBJ: Identify the city where cessation of police enforcement immediately resulted in a surge in crime.

9. "When proactive enforcement stops, crime surges" is a lesson learned from what city?
- a. Cincinnati
  - b. Houston
  - c. New York
  - d. Washington, D.C.

ANS: A                      PTS: 1                      REF: p. 39

OBJ: Identify the city where cessation of police enforcement immediately resulted in a surge in crime.

10. The stated conclusion of the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment that "routine patrol has no measurable effect on crime" became reinterpreted as
- a. preventive patrol does make a difference.
  - b. proactive patrol does make a difference.
  - c. the police do not make a difference.
  - d. police-to-citizen ratios do not make a difference.

ANS: C                      PTS: 1                      REF: p. 41

OBJ: Describe the conclusions that can be drawn from the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment.

11. Conclusions from the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment should be drawn

- a. somewhat conservatively.
- b. very conservatively.
- c. somewhat liberally.
- d. none of these choices—no conclusions can be drawn.

ANS: B                      PTS: 1                      REF: p. 43

OBJ: Describe the conclusions that can be drawn from the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment.

12. The results of the San Diego Field Interrogation Experiment indicate that field interrogations
- a. reduce crime significantly.
  - b. reduce crime marginally.
  - c. have no effect on crime.
  - d. actually increase crime.

ANS: A                      PTS: 1                      REF: p. 43

OBJ: Describe the conclusions that can be drawn from the San Diego Field Interrogation Experiment.

13. The results of the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment indicate that the best intervention in terms of preventing future abuse is
- a. arrest.
  - b. referral to social services.
  - c. separating the disputants.
  - d. mediation.

ANS: A                      PTS: 1                      REF: p. 44

OBJ: Identify the intervention suggested by the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment.

14. The results of the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment indicate that if an incident is resolved by an arrest, occurrences of calling the police to a subsequent instance of abuse will be at what percentage?
- a. 0 percent
  - b. 10 percent
  - c. 50 percent
  - d. 90 percent

ANS: B                      PTS: 1                      REF: p. 44

OBJ: Identify the intervention suggested by the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment.

15. It can be concluded from replications of the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, which were conducted in six cities, that
- a. mediation is nearly always the best resolution.
  - b. arrest is not necessarily the best resolution.
  - c. referral to social agencies is fruitless.
  - d. abuse is an intractable behavior.

ANS: B                      PTS: 1                      REF: p. 44

OBJ: Identify the intervention suggested by the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment.

16. The Indianapolis Directed Patrol program entailed the assignment of extra patrol units to
- a. a single beat.
  - b. two beats.
  - c. ten one-block street segments.
  - d. the south division.

ANS: B                      PTS: 1                      REF: p. 47

OBJ: Explain why the results of the Indianapolis Directed Patrol Program are perplexing.

17. The results of the Indianapolis Directed Patrol program are best characterized by which of the following?
- unexpected
  - as expected
  - disappointing
  - perplexing

ANS: D                      PTS: 1                      REF: p. 47

OBJ: Explain why the results of the Indianapolis Directed Patrol Program are perplexing.

18. Macro-analyses of the effect of proactive (aggressive) enforcement indicate that it tends to
- reduce serious crime.
  - result in increased serious crime.
  - have no effect.
  - reduce property crime but not violent crime.

ANS: A                      PTS: 1                      REF: p. 48

OBJ: List what we do not know regarding place-based extra patrol deployment (hot spot saturation).

19. Evidence-based analysis indicates that a promising realm of effectiveness includes
- the cultivation of diffusion.
  - focused, place-based, and proactive characteristics.
  - a community-oriented emphasis.
  - a problem-oriented emphasis.

ANS: B                      PTS: 1                      REF: p. 49

OBJ: List what we do not know regarding place-based extra patrol deployment (hot spot saturation).

20. What time frame is required for place-based extra deployment (hot spot saturation) to have a measurable effect?
- one month
  - six months
  - one year
  - we do not know

ANS: D                      PTS: 1                      REF: p. 49

OBJ: List what we do not know regarding place-based extra patrol deployment (hot spot saturation).